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Testing the Pecking Order Theory: Evidence from Chinese Listed
Companies
Jinlan Ni and Miaomiao Yu
Department of Economics
College of Business Administration
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Omaha, NE 68182
Abstract
The pecking order theory of capital structure, which predicts that firms prefer
internal to external finance, is one of the most influential theories of corporate
leverage. This paper examines if the financial structure of China’s listed companies
follows pecking order from debt to equity. Using the entire cross-section sample of
China’s listed companies in 2004, we find no evidence that China’s listed companies
follow the pecking order when they need funds to finance the investment projects.
Further subgroup analyses indicate that big companies follow pecking order and
small and medium companies do not. These results suggest that Chinese capital
market is still under developing, however, the big companies face a relatively loose
financing environment than the small ones.
JEL: G32
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1. Introduction
How should firms finance their investment projects? Two competing theories offer the
optimal capital structure for this financing decision: traditional (static) trade-off theory and
pecking order theory. The former suggests that a value maximizing firm will pursue an
optimal debt-to-value ratio by a tradeoff of the tax benefits of debt and the cost of financial
distress. Marsh (1982) and Taggart (1977) provided evidence that firms adjust toward a target
debt-to-value ratio. However, Myers (1984) argued that the poor fitness of econometric
model and dramatically different actual debt ratios across similar firms make it plausible for
the static tradeoff theory.
Myers and Majlus (1984) proposed the second framework, the pecking order theory based
on asymmetric information—managers have more inside information than the investors and
act in favor of old shareholders. Their theory suggests that there is no optimal ratio and firms
prefer debt to equity if external financing is required. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)
further developed an empirical model that financial deficit should have a dollar-for-dollar
impact on firm leverage if pecking order is followed. That is, one dollar increase in financial
deficit leads to one dollar increase in a firm’s leverage. Using 157 firms that started at year
1981 and survived through 1981- 1989 from Compustat data, they found strong evidence to
support the pecking order predictions.1
The purpose of this paper is to examine if Chinese listed companies follow the above
pecking order theory in their financing decision. Using a unique sample of 407 listed Chinese
companies at Shanghai Stock Exchange Center in year 2004, we find no evidence that the
Chinese companies follow the pecking order theory. we further examine the pecking order
theory in the narrow sets of firms. First, we focus on firms with the moderate debt ratio since
Myers (1984) suggested that the modified pecking order theory is more suitable for
1

Chirinko and Singha (2000) put a critical comment on this paper. Their results indicated that Shyam-Sunder
and Myers’ results can evaluate neither the Pecking Order nor Static Tradeoff Models.
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companies with moderate debt ratio. The results indicate that the moderate debt ratio
companies do not follow the pecking order either. Second, we break our sample by firm size
(big, medium, and small) since small firms are expected to follow pecking order theory due
to large information asymmetry. Contrary to the theory, our evidences show that only the big
companies follow the pecking order. If the pecking order theory is correct, then the fact that
the small and medium firms do not follow pecking order reflects the inefficient capital market
in China. It is not surprising since Chinese economy is in a unique stage of both developing
and transition economy. However, the big companies in China seem to have looser financing
environment.
The above results are consistent with those in Frank and Goyal (2003). Using a broad
cross-section of publicly traded American firms over the period 1971-1998, Frank and Goyal
(2003) showed that the financial deficit is an important factor of the corporate leverage, but
there is no evidence to support the pecking order. Similarly, they did find that the financing
behavior of the largest quartile firms in earlier years follow the pecking order when narrower
samples of firms were considered. However, this support for the pecking order theory
declines over time. They argued that Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) had a surviving bias
led their small sample toward larger firms and thus did affect their conclusion.
However, Chen and Zhao (2004) argued that Frank and Goyal’s results were driven by
their large debt reduction firms. After studying the financial decisions of firms with different
bankruptcy risks, they found a clear preference of debt over equity. They further found that
the pecking order from debt to equity strengthens from low to medium bankruptcy risk firms.
Similarly, Adrian Zoppa and Richard G. P. McMahon (2001) examined a panel of 871
manufacturing Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) from the Australian survey data for
three financial years from 1995-96 to 1997-98, and provided substantial empirical evidence
supporting pecking order financing behavior amongst SMES.

3

Two papers have examined the capital structure of Chinese listed companies in the
literature. Using a panel sample of 1200 Chinese listed companies from 1994 to 2003, Huang
and Song (2006) investigated the determinants of the leverage of Chinese listed companies.
They conjectured that the static trade-off model explains the capital structure of Chinese
listed companies better than the pecking order hypothesis. 2 Conversely, Tong and Green
(2005) found Chinese companies do follow pecking order using 47 listed Chinese companies.
Different from the above models, we explain the difference of our results in that we use
pecking order model originally from Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and they used the
leverage model that indicates the determinant of leverage. To show this, we repeat their
analysis and find the similar results that the leverage is determined by growth rate, company
size, profitability and dividend. However, this does not indicate that the increase of fund
deficit has the same proportion increase in the liability, which is what the pecking order
model wants to investigate. Our paper fills this gap.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section introduces background of
Chinese capital market. Section 3 introduces the data and methodology. Section 4 discusses
the regression results. Conclusion follows in final section.

2. Background of Chinese Capital Market
China has a large capital supply after economic reform and development with more than
twenty years. Figure 1 shows the national saving amount increased from 9,241.6 in 1991 to
119,555.4 million Yuan in 2004 3 . Chinese households used to and still have to save for
prompt demand due to the underdeveloped social security system, increasing health care
expenditures, increasing education expenditure and the costly real assets. The resulting high

2

However, Tong and Green (2005) pointed out that their methodology is not appropriate to draw such a
conclusion. See more discussion at Tong and Green (2005) P. 2181.
3
Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. China Statistical Yearbook, China Statistics Press, 2005.
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savings imply the abundant external funding resources to Chinese listed companies. This is
realized through three main financing channels: banking system, stock market, and corporate
bond market.
Chinese banking sectors were and continually have been the primary source of companies’
long-term debt in China (Bekier, 2005). There are big four state-owned commercial banks,
which play the major roles in banking sector. As Hodgson (2004) pointed, they hold about 75
percent of the total bank assets. However, there exist many problems with the banking
systems. First, the interest rates are still under control of Chinese central government due to
past planed economy. Second, the banks established abnormal close relationship with
companies based on non-profit reasons (called GuanXi). Third, the existing huge amount of
bad loans and lower profitability indicate their inefficient risk management. This largely
limits the new companies’ financing channels. Finally, banks are much more cautious than
ever in debt loan. They accept more short-term debt and mortgage loans. In 2004, the shortterm loans of financial institutions were 8,684.060 billions of Yuan, whereas the mediumterm and long-term loans are 7,670.290 billions of Yuan.4
The alternative funding sources are the capital markets established and rapidly developed
over one decade. In 1990, the first stock exchange center, Shanghai Stock Exchange, was
established at metropolitan Shanghai, and Shenzhen Stock Exchange was established at
Shenzhen in the following year. After more than ten years of development, the number of
listed companies in 2004 reaches 1,3775, while the capital raised by stock is about 1,510.94
millions of Yuan (issued share*issuing price). In order to meet the demand of foreign
currencies for domestic companies, the government created a B share market in 1992. The
participators of B share were limited to foreign investors before 2002. After that, B share
4

Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2005, China Statistics Press.
Financial institutions include banks, savings deposit agencies of postal offices, housing saving banks, urban
credit cooperative banks, rural credit cooperatives, urban credit banks, foreign-funded banks, financial trust
investment agencies and financial companies etc.
5
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market was opened to individual domestic citizens (Chien-Liang Chiu et al., 2005). In 2004,
there were 86 companies issuing both A and B shares, and 24 companies issuing only B
share6.
Figure 2 shows the trend of funds raised by corporate bonds and shares from 1991 to 2004
respectively. The data are from China Statistical Yearbook 1996-20057. The shares include A
Shares, Rights Issued, H&N Shares and B shares. Compared with corporate bond market, the

stock market is rapidly developed. As we can see from figure 2, the values of shares issued
dramatically increase from 5 millions of Yuan in the year of1991 to 1,510.94 millions of Yuan
in year 2004. Chinese government was introducing more market mechanism and relaxing the
regulations gradually for the two stock exchanges. For example, Administrative Measures for
Securities Issuance of Listed Companies (AMSILC) were issued by China Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2006. The AMSILC states that one of the roles of CSRC
is to act as the third party for supervision or even directly interfering with the securities trade.
In contrast, the relatively flat curve of corporate bond indicates that the Chinese bond
market is slowly developed. It is true that there exist many stimuli to the bond market reform,
for example, the investment demand from insurance companies and foreign investors.
However, the qualifications for the firms to issue bonds are very strict because of the absence
of efficient credit rating systems. The complicated approval procedure in debt financing,
quota control and the requirement of collateral significantly restrict the development of
corporate bond market. Furthermore, Chinese companies’ opaque financial records defer the
potential bond investors and impede the expansion of the bond market (Chen Ji and Stephen
Thomas, 2005).
In sum, the financing channels in China consist of the weak banking system, the

6
7
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undeveloped corporate bond market and rapidly developed stock market in China. Our paper
is trying to explore the financing structure of Chinese listed companies under current capital
market.

3. Data and Methodology
The dataset in this paper is manually collected from 2004 unconsolidated annual financial
reports of 422 companies8 that are randomly selected from Shanghai Stock Exchange current
listed companies. Of the 422 firms, six financial companies are excluded and four companies
do not have enough information for the study. Furthermore, we drop 5 outliers with negative
ownership equities. This leaves 407 listed companies for the empirical analysis.
Our empirical model is similar to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) that is derived from the
pecking order theory in Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984). Assuming that firms can
finance their projects by retained earnings, debt and equity, the pecking order theory predicts
that firms will fund their projects using retained earnings first, then use debt if retained
earnings are inadequate, and turn to the equity financing if they have to — no more debt
available and costs of financial distress are high. According to the theory, the pecking order
hypothesis is to test:
Di =  +  DEFi +  i

(1)

Where Di denotes long term debt outstanding by firm i in Shyam-Sunder and Myers’s
model. Because Chinese companies employ current liability rather than the long-term debt as
the major means of debt financing, we define Di as the change of total liability (i.e. total
liability at the end of year t – total liability at start of year t).

DEFi is the flow of fund

deficit defined as follows:

8
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DEFi = DIVi + X i + Wi - Ci 9

Where:
DIVi 10:

Cash payments for dividend, profit and interest for firm i ,

Ci 11:

Operating cash flow after taxes for firm i ,

Xi :

Capital expenditure for firm i , is a summation of the amount of increase in long
term investment, the amount of increase in fixed asset, and the amount of
increase in intangible asset and other asset; the amount of increase is defined as
“the amount at the end of year t minus the amount at start of year t”,

Wi :

Increase in working capital, working capital is defined as the difference between
liquid asset and current liability, i.e., working capital = liquid asset – current
liability.

Table 1 summarizes the above variables. Following Tong and Green (2005), all the
data are measured by book value based on the fact that the book values are more reliable in
China. As we can see at Table 1, the average ratio of current liability to total liability ( RCT )
is about 84 percent for Chinese listed companies. The maximum ratio even reaches 100
percent. It implies that Chinese listed companies hardly rely on long term liability to raise
external funds. However, this differs by company size. At last three columns, we summarize
the mean of all variables for small, medium and large sizes. As we can see from the average
ratio of current liability to total liability (RCT), the large firms rely more on long term debt
9

Note that Shyam-Sunder and Myers define DEFi

= DIVi + X i + Wi + Ri - Ci where Ri is the current

portion of long-term debt. According to the accounting definition and accounting data disclosure complying
with the Chinese General Accepted Accounting Principles (CGAAP), the current portion of long-term debt ( Ri )
is already contained in the working capital

Wi . Therefore, we do not include Ri as a separate component of

DEFi in our model to avoid double calculation.
10

Instead of using cash dividends as Shyam-Sunder and Myers, we include profit and interest as well since the
Chinese annual financial statement only provides a mixed item of Cash Payments for dividend, profit and
interest.
11
Shyam-Sunder and Myers define it as cash flows after interest and taxes. We exclude taxes only since the
interest is part of DIVi .
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than other two kinds of firms. In addition, large firms pay more dividends (DIV) and have
much more cash flows than small and medium companies (C). In particular, the capital
expenditure (X) for large firms is much higher than the others. According to the definition of
X, it implies that to some extent the large firms have more expenditure in long term
investment projects or more investment in fixed assets. On the contrary, the negative X value
for small firms means that many of them are in contraction.
The regression analyses of model (1) are conducted in next section. If the firms’ capital
structure follows the pecking order, then we expect to see that  = 0 and  = 1 . In other
words, the firm will tend to use debt to meet financing deficit, and equity issue or repurchase
is treated as “last resort”. On the contrary, if  is close to 0, it implies that Chinese listed
companies prefer equity rather than debt.

4. Regression Results
First, we conduct Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression on our 407 cross-sectional
observations using the pecking order model (1). We then discuss our model by repeating
leverage model used by Huang and Song (2006) and Tong and Green (2005). Doing this, we
make our conclusion that Chinese listed companies do not follow pecking order theory.
4.1 Pecking Order Model Regression
We first conduct regression of model (1) to the entire sample. Then, we break the sample
by debt ratios since Myers’ (1984) modified pecking order theory suggests that the firms with
moderate leverage will follow the pecking order the best. Finally, we break the whole sample
by company size. As Frank and Goyal (2003) suggested, the small firms confronting with
relatively worse adverse selection problems should more likely match the pecking order
predictions.
We find no evidence that Chinese companies follow pecking order from our regression to

9

the entire sample. As we can see at column (1) in Table 2, we find that the increase fund flow
of deficits significantly increase the company new debts. However, the coefficient of DEFi is
rather low (0.152). We further test the joint hypothesis of pecking order that  = 0 and  = 1 ,
the results of F-test indicate that the pecking order hypothesis is strongly rejected. Therefore,
Chinese listed companies prone to equity issue when external funds are required. This
compliments with the findings at Huang and Song (2006) that Tobin’s Q (the ratio of the
market value of a firm's assets), a measurement of firms’ performance, for Chinese listed
companies is extremely high. This implies that the stock values are excessively overestimated
in China. According to the market timing theory, firms tend to issue more equity when their
stocks are overestimated. Huang and Fung (2005) argued that a distinct characteristic
between China’s stock market and other developed countries’ is that, in China, there exist
nonfloatable shares that are held by the corporate controllers and can not be traded in either
Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The value of the nonfloatable shares
is positively correlated with the market values of firm’s equity. 12 In order to increase the
expected value of nonfloatable shares, the firm controllers tend to issue maximum amount of
equity.
Second, our results show that firms with moderate debt ratio do not follow pecking order
either. Following Frank and Goyal (2003), the moderate debt ratio group excludes the
companies with either the top two deciles or the bottom two deciles debt ratios. As we can see
from the column (2) in Table 2, the results for the moderate leverage companies are similar to
those with the entire sample. Therefore, there is no any evidence to support pecking order
among Chinese listed companies, even for the firms with the moderate debt ratio.
Finally, we do find that the large Chinese companies follow pecking order. Table 3
provides the regression results for small, medium and big companies. The coefficient for

12

See more discussions about liquidity premium and market-to-book ratio at Huang and Fung (2005).
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small companies is not significant, while the coefficient for big companies is the highest
(0.896) and significant at the 1 percent level. This is comparable with the results in ShyamSunder and Myers (1999) for 157 companies (about 0.7) and Frank and Goyal (2003) for big
companies (about 0.7). The F-tests of our joint hypothesis indicate that the big companies
match well with the pecking order predictions. The results are consistent with Frank and
Goyal (2003) that found only the big companies follow the pecking order but the entire
sample (including the small ones) does not. This, however, contradicts the pecking order
theory that the small firms will follow the best because small firms confront more serious
asymmetric information than the big ones.
Why, in general, Chinese listed companies do not follow the pecking order, but the large
companies do? This may be due to the inefficient capital structure for the special stage of
Chinese developing and transition economy. First, as we show at section 2, the bond market
is slowly developed due to strict qualifications for the firms to issue bonds. This leads to the
results that only some excellent large firms can be approved to enter the corporate bond
market, especially some large state-owned enterprises. The large state-owned companies
which are protected by the government not only have advantages to access to the corporate
bond market, but also could use government credit to obtain loans from commercial banks or
other financial institutions. Second, the big four state-owned commercial banks still play the
significant roles in banking sector as shown in section 2. However, they are not operated as
efficient as they should be. The existing huge amount of bad loans and lower profitability
make banks much more cautious than ever. The big companies with more fixed assets that
could be used as collateral would be easier than small firms to acquire the debt from banks.
Our conclusion contradicts with Tong and Green (2005), which claimed that Chinese
companies follow pecking order using 44 companies. Tong and Green (2005) used a leverage
determinant model that, in our point of view, deviates from the original testing model of

11

pecking order. The leverage model captures the determinants of leverage, but it does not
capture the dollar-for-dollar relationship that indicates that a dollar increase in fund deficit
increases one dollar of debt ratio. To show this, we will briefly introduce the leverage model
and test the model to compare with pecking order model at next subsection.
4.2 Leverage Model Regression
The general leverage determinant model used to test the pecking order is given as follows:
LEVi = SIZEi+ GROWTHi + DIVi + ROAi+ ei
LEV denotes the leverage, which is the ratio of total liability to total assets at the end of
year. The SIZE in the model is measured by the natural logarithm of annual sales during the
year following Huang and Song (2006). The variable GROWTH is defined as the total assets
book value at the end of the year divided by total assets at the beginning of the same year.
DIV is the cash payments for dividend, profit and interest at the end of year scaled by mean
value of total equity. Profitability (ROA) in this study is measured by profits from operations
divided by the mean value of total assets. The above variables are summarized in Table 4.
The correlations of the above variables are presented at Table 5. We see that the leverage is
positively correlated with company size, growth rate, and dividend, and negatively correlated
with profitability.
Table 6 reports the regression results. We conduct the leverage model using our 394 data,
since 13 companies do not provide the sales data for unconsolidated accounts. Tong and
Green (2005) conclude that the results tend to favor the pecking order theory based on the
sign of coefficient for each variable in the model. We get the identical sign of coefficient for
each factor in the model as Tong and Green (2005)’s: The firms’ leverage is positively
associated with company size, growth rate and dividend, and is negatively related with
profitability. However, this does not imply that an increase of flow of fund deficit has a
proportional impact on new liability as pecking order indicated. In particular, we put the
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following two comments to the impact of size and growth rate on the leverage in the
following.
First comment goes to the firm size and asymmetric information. Tong and Green (2005)
argue that the larger firms with complex organization face the higher costs of information
asymmetries. In this way, they insist that the positive relationship conforms to the pecking
order theory. However, from original pecking order model assumption, the asymmetric
information is defined as how much the outsiders (investors) know the insider information
(firms). Therefore, small firms have relatively more serious asymmetric information between
firms and outside investors and thus should track pecking order more closely.13 Therefore,
whether the positive relationship should be interpreted as supporting evidence for pecking
order theory or not is a question.
Second, the positive relationship between the asset growth rates and leverage may be not
sufficient to prove the pecking order theory. Huang and Song (2006) point out that the firms
with high growth rate in the past tend to have higher leverage, while firms with good
investment opportunities in the future tend to have lower leverage. It may be helpful to look
across the firms with different growth rates using original pecking order model.14
In summarize, leverage model does characterize that firm’s leverage is determined by firm
size, growth rate, dividend and profitability. However, we do not find that the debt ratio
increases proportionally with the fund deficit. Therefore, we cannot make a conclusion that
Chinese listed companies follow pecking order.

5. Conclusions and Implications
We examine whether the Chinese listed companies’ financing decisions are consistent with

13

This is also confirmed by Frank and Goyal (2003).
Frank and Goyal (2003) investigated this but found no evidence that firms with high growth rate follow
pecking order.
14

13

the pecking order theory. Using a sample of 407 companies, we find no evidence that the
capital structure of Chinese companies follows pecking order from retained earnings, debt to
equity. Further, we find that the companies with the moderate debt ratios do not follow
pecking order, which is against Myers (1984) that the companies with the moderate debt ratio
will follow the pecking order the best. Finally, contrary to the implication of the pecking
order theory that the small companies will follow the pecking order the best, our results
indicate the opposite: big companies follow the pecking order while small and medium
companies do not.
These findings are generally not consistent with those of prior studies in the developed
markets such as Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Chen and Zhao (2004), Zoppa and
McMahon (2001).15 The main reason may be due to the imperfect Chinese capital market
described in section 2. Simply speaking, the high entrance requirements of China’s corporate
bond market make it impossible for the companies to finance by debt. The inefficiency of
four state-owned commercial banks largely affects the companies’ finance decision. In
addition, current economic laws are not fully developed to protect the minority shareholders.
This makes the equity financing of the companies much more attractive in China. Therefore,
it is necessary to have further reform of the banking system, development of corporate bond
market and improvement of stock market to change the inefficient companies’ financing
structure. As Franklin Allen et al. (2003) suggested, it would be wise to develop an
appropriate reform pattern based on China’s existing financial system rather than simply copy
other advanced countries’.

15

We have discussed the difference between our results and those undertaken by Tong and Green (2005) in
previous section.
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Tables:

Table 1: Descriptive of Variables
(Unit: Billions of Chinese Yuan)
Variable Obs

D
DEF
X
W
DIV
C
RCT

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Variable Means by Company
Size
Small
companies
0.0193
-0.6601

Medium Large
Companies Companies
0.1628
1.0156
0.0521
-0.0532

-0.6115
-0.0076

0.1594
-0.0413

1.2620
-0.3887

0.0401
0.1060

0.3610
1.2875

0.8618

0.7752

407

0.3977

2.82

-8.12

49.00

407

-0.2208

4.87

-89.60

17.20

407

0.26751

5.59

-89.50

63.10

407

-0.1453

1.37

-23.40

3.16

407

0.13978

0.67

-0.19

11.70

407

0.48284

2.42

-0.78

34.20

0.0199
0.0609

407

0.84377

0.19

0.06

1.00

0.8938

Note:
D = Total liability at the end of year t – total liability at start of year t.

DEF = DIV + X + W − C , where
DIV : Cash Payments for dividend, profit and interest for each firm,
X : Capital expenditure, Capital expenditure of the firm = Increase in long term investment +
Increase in fixed asset + Increase in intangible asset and other asset,
W : Increase in working capital, working capital = liquid asset – current liability,
C : Operating cash flow after taxes for each firm.
RCT : Mean value of current liability / Mean value of total book liability.

Table 2: Results of Pecking Order Model
Whole Sample

Moderate Leverage

0.152

0.134

(0.028)***

(0.033)***

0.004

0.005

(0.001)***

(0.002)**

Observations

407

244

R-squared

0.07

0.06

F = 937.06

F = 693.52

Prob > F = 0.0000

Prob > F = 0.000

DEF
Constant

Hypothesis: α=0 and β=1

Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3: Results of Pecking Order Model
Whole Sample
DEF
Constant

Small Companies

Medium Companies

Large Companies

0.152

0.001

0.383

0.896

(0.028)***

(0.001)

(0.079)***

(0.093)***

0.004

0.000

0.001

0.011

(0.001)***

(0.000)**

(0.000)***

(0.003)***

Observations

407

136

136

135

R-squared

0.07

0.01

0.15

0.41

F= 937.06

F = 5.8e+05

F = 60.98

F = 1.25

Prob > F = 0.0000

Prob > F = 0.2665

Hypothesis: α=0 and β=1

Prob > F = 0.0000
Prob > F = 0.0000
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 4: Descriptive of Variables
Variable
LEV
SIZE
GROWTH
DIV
ROA

Obs
407
394
407
407
407

Mean
0.40
13.26
1.16
0.05
0.04

Std. Dev.
0.19
1.88
0.29
0.06
0.07

Min
0.01
4.56
0.41
-0.14
-0.25

Max
0.97
19.80
3.94
0.76
0.50

Note: LEV = Total book liability at the end of 2004/ Total book assets at the end of 2004
SIZE= Ln (Sales in 2004)
GROWTH = Total book assets at the end of 2004 / Total book assets at the beginning of 2004
DIV = Cash Payments for dividend, profit and interest at the end of 2004 / Mean value of total equity
ROA = Profits from operations / Mean value of total book assets

Table 5: Correlation
LEV
SIZE
GROWTH
DIV
ROA

LEV
1
0.2506
0.2084
0.4156
-0.1556

SIZE

GROWTH

DIV

ROA

1
0.2706
0.1802
0.4289

1
0.0888
0.3754

1
0.058

1
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Table 6: Leverage Model
SIZE
GROWTH
DIV
ROA
Constant

0.028
(0.005)***
0.156
(0.029)***
1.091
(0.126)***
-1.027
(0.126)***
-0.161
(0.063)**
394
0.34

Observations
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Figure 1: Savings Deposit in Urban and Rural Areas (Unit: 100M Yuan)
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. China Statistical Yearbook 1996-2005, China
Statistics Press.
Note:
1. Raised Capital by Share includes A Shares, Rights Issued, H&N Shares and B shares.
2. China Statistical Yearbook does not provide the data of corporate bond issue in 1999. We use the
average number of the two adjacent numbers in 1998 and 2000 to approximate the corporate bond
issue in 1999.

Figure 2: Funds Raised by Corporate Bond and Share (Unit: 100M Yuan)
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